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Abstract
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1. Introduction
This article explores the emergence of a movement of
volunteers who work with asylum seekers in Germany.
Based on quantitative and qualitative data, it intends to
facilitate a better understanding of the role emotions
play in volunteers’ motivations (see also Sutter, 2017).
In the sociological study of social movements, emotions
have mostly been framed as being particular to the indi-
vidual’s intrinsic motivations for his or her participation
in the respectivemovement, or as an element which con-
tributes to a movement’s collective dimension. Based on
approaches that understand emotions as being closely
linked to reason, this article aims to illustrate that emo-
tions also operate at the boundaries of such collectives.
As emotions express judgments and imply reasoning,
they can reconfigure modes of belonging.
2. Welcome Culture
The public reaction towards the arrival of large num-
bers of refugees in Germany has been labeled a “cul-
ture of welcome/hospitality”, a concept which had pre-
viously been associated with a reform of the labor mar-
ket for highly-skilled migrant workers.1 However, during
the summer of 2015, the meaning of “welcome culture”
1 The Dublin Regulation can be considered a form of Europeanization of themeasures that were taken during the reform of the asylum-related paragraph
in the German constitution in 1992. After its first “refugee crisis” in the 1990s, when around 400,000 Yugoslavian refugees arrived only in 1991, the
parliament voted to add a paragraph to the constitution according to which asylum seekers could only apply for asylum when they had not crossed
a safe country on their way to Germany. This reference to safe countries in the regulation is the principle by which main destination states in Europe
have established a cordon sanitaire both within and outside the borders of the European Union. Politically, although Germany came to terms with its
historical flows of immigration in around 2000, it still has no proper migration law. Entry requirements for potential migrants are designed in such a way
that only highly qualified individuals, whose incomes are higher than average, are actually able to successfully immigrate. This is partly the result of a
political impasse, to which trade unions also have contributed in their attempt to prevent a decline in average wages. This is the historical background
of the term “welcome culture”: The failure of immigration law to attract foreign labor and increasing concerns about demographics and a shrinking
German population led to demand for a reform of the labor laws, predominantly by economists and employers’ associations. Thus, the term “welcome
culture” was largely introduced to the German debate by organizations such as the VDI (Verein deutscher Ingenieure; Association of German engineers)
and the BDA (Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeber; Federation of German Employers). Strikingly, the term was often mentioned only in connection with the
recruitment of specialists. In other words, the demand for a welcome culture seems to be a consequence of negative experiences with the so-called
“green card” model and bureaucratic obstacles in Germany.
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changed for newly-arrivingmigrants. Beginning in August
2015, hundreds of thousands of Germans joined volun-
tary associations or formed spontaneous initiatives in
an effort to support the large numbers of refugees ar-
riving in the country. Several surveys indicate that be-
tween 10 and 20 percent of Germany’s adult population
have joined such initiatives and projects aimed to help
refugees since August 2015 (Ahrens, 2015; Bertelsmann-
Stiftung, 2017; SI EKD, 2016).
Trade unions, companies, public offices, and the me-
dia joined in a chorus of celebrating both the arrival of
hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers,
and of celebrating the hospitality offered by a signifi-
cant portion of Germany’s population. Even the populist
and usually conservative-leaning tabloid BILD supported
emergent grassroots hospitality with its own campaign,
Wir helfen! (or “We Help!”). The events reported to the
German public—refugees stranded in makeshift camps
along the so-called Balkan route from Greece to Aus-
tria; trapped and beaten in a Budapest train station; the
suffering of families and young children—and the posi-
tive response on the part of German authorities and the
media helped to turn a pre-existent but small volunteer
movement into a mainstream initiative, involving large
and diverse parts of German society. At times, the en-
gagement seemed to hyperbolize, particularly when Ger-
mans flocked to train stations in order to applaud arriving
refugees, or when some drove their cars to Hungary or
Croatia to bring refugees across the border to Germany
or Austria (see Kasparek & Speer, 2015;Misik, 2015). The
atmosphere of these weeks was marked by excitement
and enthusiasm, which, in turn, led to a political debate
about the alleged irrationality of the all-too-positive feel-
ings towards refugees on the part of the German public.
For example, Phillip Lengsfeld, a member of parliament
for the conservative CDU party, criticized BILD for cov-
ering the refugee crisis “too emotionally”, and asserted
that its attitude would “invite” refugees to come to Eu-
rope (Handelsblatt, 17.2.2016). The same topic was ad-
dressed in a strategy paper which dealt with civil resis-
tance towards the deportation of newly-arrived refugees.
The paper, produced by representatives of the German
state’s “Innenminister” (Ministry of Home Affairs), ar-
gued that “for a small, but active part of the population,
as well as in large parts of the media, deportation mea-
sures and decisions are being portrayed exclusively from
an emotional viewpoint, and not from the viewpoint of
the rule of law (ordnungsrechtlich)” (quoted in Scherr,
2016, p. 3). Authorities, politicians, and journalists ex-
pressed their concern about the role of emotions in pol-
itics, based on the widespread notion that emotions are
inherently irrational.
For most of the political and academic observers, the
welcoming atmosphere during the first months of the
so-called refugee crisis (Flüchtlingskrise) came as a sur-
prise. One of the reasons people were astonished might
be that public opinion about migration in Germany has
been negative until quite recently. According to ALLBUS2
survey data from 1996, Germans wanted migration to
be restricted (57,1 percent) or entirely banned (34,8 per-
cent) for non-EU citizens.3 The data is similar regarding
asylum seekers or so-called “resettlers” from Eastern Eu-
rope who possess a German background. Ten years later,
in 2004, the share of Germans who stated that migration
contributes positively to the economy was only around
27 percent; in the same year, almost 72 percent wanted
less migration to Germany. These numbers changed sig-
nificantly in the following decade: in 2014, roughly half of
the respondents (51,4 percent) thought that migration
has a positive impact on the economy and 49 percent
wanted less immigration. These figures suggest that al-
though public opinion regardingmigration has shifted to-
wards amore positive stance, the issue is still far from be-
ing uncontroversial (see GESIS 2014, 2015). This change
in attitudes has also affected the public’s view of asylum,
despite the number of asylum seekers in Germany hav-
ing reached a historical low in 2007, when only 20,000
people applied—in fact, the lowest number in decades.
From 2008 onwards, however, the number of applica-
tions started to rise again, almost exponentially. Accord-
ing to our own survey from 2014 (see below), the num-
ber of volunteers for refugees had increased between
2011 and 2014 by around 70 percent (Karakayali & Kleist,
2015). Although the timeframes accounted for here do
not entirely match, they still suggest that these two ob-
servations are related to each other.
3. Database
The findings presented here are based on four sets of
data. The first two are online surveys: one of them con-
ducted among volunteers and professionals working in
support organizations. The first survey, conducted in
2014, involved 466 volunteers and 79 representatives
from organizations in the field of refugee work; the
second survey followed one year later, and included
2291 volunteers exclusively. Both were conducted on-
line (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015, 2016).4 The initial sur-
vey was planned and conducted at a time when there
were apparently few people actively volunteering in this
2 ALLBUS is a general social survey of the German population, conducted since 1980. It covers a wide range of item batteries, from socio-demographic
to opinion data. ALLBUS is part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), so findings are largely comparable to survey data in many other
countries.
3 As international social survey data suggests, these figures are not specific to Germany. The vast majority of respondents in the countries—from Aus-
tralia to the Slovak Republic—participating in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP Research Group, 1998) share similar attitudes towards
immigration, i.e., between 60 and 80 percent of the respective populations are estimated to want immigration reduced. The only exceptions are
Ireland—where only 21 percent of the respondents wanted less migration—and Spain, Canada and Japan with approximately 40 percent.
4 The surveys were conducted together with Olaf Kleist (University of Osnabrück), the interviews were conducted in cooperation with Ulrike Hamann
(Humboldt University) and our student assistants Mira Wallis, Leif Höfler and Laura Lambert.
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 7–16 8
field. According to representative survey data on volun-
teering in Germany, the number of volunteers working
with migrants or refugees as clients from 2009 was ex-
tremely small (0,72 percent of the sample in the FSW
Study from 2009, Gensicke & Geiss, 2010). The findings
of this general survey imply that volunteering formigrant-
and/or refugee-related causes was, until very recently,
a minor social phenomenon; these findings also explain
why it was not possible to use existing databases on
volunteering for the purpose of this study. The figures
in the 2009 survey—the only database available until
very recently—suggested that random sampling meth-
ods would require the collection of rather large samples.
We therefore chose to address volunteering initiatives,
associations, and organizations directly, by collecting ap-
proximately 1500 e-mail addresses throughout the coun-
try. The downside of this sampling strategy is that we
could not control its representativity. However, the repe-
tition of the survey with an almost unchanged question-
naire, sent to the same addresses, partly alleviated this
downside. It allowed us to compare the two datasets di-
achronically, revealing certain developments over time.
What is striking about the samples is the increase in the
number of respondents from the first survey to the sec-
ond survey. This is likely due to the significant number
of people who became active in migrant- and refugee-
related work in 2015, rather than due to the use of a
different sampling strategy. More than 60 percent of
respondents in the second survey stated that they be-
came active in 2015. The third set of data consists of
semi-structured interviews with individuals who coordi-
nate volunteer activities (mostly volunteers themselves)
in thirty communities across Germany (dataset referred
to as CO), which were led in February and March 2016.
Another round of interviews was conducted with volun-
teers later that year, both as individual interviews and as
group interviews held in different cities and “Bundeslän-
der” (German states). For the analysis of emotions in the
emergent volunteering movement, it is primarily these
interviews which will be used.
4. Emotions, Atmospheres and Social Movements
The study of emotions had a comeback in Social Move-
ment Studies, where it had led “a shadow existence for
the last three decades” (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta,
2000, p. 65), i.e. since social movement scholars towards
the end of the 1960s felt the need to balance the then-
prevalent notion that social movements weremerely the
result of the irrational behavior of crowds and mobs.
Crowds were assumed to be governed by almost hyp-
notic processes that “overwhelmed individual personali-
ties andmoved thembeyond reason and normal sensibil-
ities” (Goodwin et al., 2000, p. 66). Breaking with the pe-
jorative tradition, scholars since the 1970s looked for dif-
ferent theoretical models and mostly found them in ap-
proaches which emphasized the rationality of social and
political agents: “The task for sociologists has been to
showhow these spontaneous and apparently unpremed-
itated outbreaks of disorder could still be defined as ra-
tional in terms of their underlyingmotivation” (Wadding-
ton, 2008, p. 6).
With the dominance of the mobilization model, re-
searchers are nowmostly interested in how protest is or-
ganized, framed and mobilized. What prominent schol-
ars of Social Movements Studies such as James Jasper
andothers have criticized is thatwith this paradigm, emo-
tions are kept entirely out of focus, although they appar-
ently play an important role in protest—or, as Borch ar-
gues, they even led researchers to “misunderstand the
causal mechanisms by which their own key concepts
operated” (Borch, 2009, p. 71). As Benford has noted
two decades ago, “we continue to write as though our
movement actors (when we actually acknowledge hu-
mans in our texts) are Spock-like beings, devoid of pas-
sion and other human emotions” (Benford, 1997, p. 419)
The main reason emotions needed to be kept out of the
study of social movements was that the “new generation
of theorists shared with the older ones one big assump-
tion, namely, that emotions are irrational” (Goodwin et
al., 2000, p. 71). There is a large body of literature deal-
ingwith the nature of emotions in the social sciences; the
range of theories spans from hard and soft construction-
ist views, i.e. that emotions are social in nature or at least
socially shaped (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012; Hochschild,
1983), to approaches that consider feelings to be natu-
rally “pre-wired” in the brain (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Izard,
1991). It seems that judgement about the irrationality of
emotions is tied inwith the latter, naturalistic idea, which
also corresponds to themind-body dualismwhich is char-
acteristic of Western thought.
Of particular interest for the purpose ofmy argument
is work which focuses on the role of emotions in the
forging of social bonds and in the formation of collec-
tives, such as the work of Thomas Scheff (1994), who,
as did Goffman (1963) half a century earlier, has ana-
lyzed feelings of shame and pride as being constitutive
for the formation of collective action. Scheff understands
them to be essentially social, as they regulate the at-
tachment of individuals to each other, where pride con-
nects and shame disconnects. James Jasper (1998) adds
to this, more generally, the affective ties of love, friend-
ship, and—particularly important for the context of this
article—solidarity as emotions that make collectives. Al-
though feelings play a more prominent role now, they
are still largely conceptualized within the mechanics of
movements as organisms. Positive feelings have bond-
ing functions for the respective “in-group”, i.e. (potential)
participants in a social movement or any given social col-
lective. This line of thought corresponds with how sociol-
ogists since Durkheim have conceptualized the function
of emotions for transindividual entities (families, groups,
collectives, communities, nations, etc.). Randall Collins
e.g. sees “emotional energy” as a key to understand-
ing collectives, formed in face-to-face interactions and
through “interaction ritual chains” (Collins, 2001). Soli-
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darity, both in the recent conceptualization of emotion in
social movement studies, and in most of the general so-
ciological literature (Bayertz, 1999), is seen as the bond
between members of a given group or collective. Feel-
ings can create and constitute, or in a weaker version,
enhance and influence, these bonds, but there is rather
little attention paid to how emotions contribute to ex-
panding the group or remaking it with new parameters.
If emotions are important for in-group relations, they
should also be important for those phenomena where
actions and relationships exceed the group or collective,
or where the constitution of the groups is characterized
by strategies of expansion, as Wimmer (2008) has called
them. To put it the other way around: if solidarity signi-
fies that a number of otherwise unconnected individuals
have something in common, and feel that they belong to-
gether or should form a collective, then what can be said
of “international solidarity” or, solidarity with foreigners,
immigrants, or in our case, refugees? If being part of a so-
ciety means that people who are strangers to each other
come to engagewith through a network of dependencies
and complex mediated relationships, a study of solidari-
ties with non-members of a given group or society might
contribute to a more profound understanding of solidar-
ity in general. To be able to do this, we have to emphasize
that our understanding of emotions should not be con-
fined to the subject’s inner sphere and that we should try
to capture what escapes, exceeds, or transcends this in-
ner life of the subject towards what “affects” others (Hat-
field, Cacioppo, & Richard, 1994). This includes questions
of how feelings circulate, how they are transmitted, and
how this sometimes results in a change of the social or
political “atmosphere”.5
5. Emotions as Judgements
There is solid evidence today that emotions are cultur-
ally shaped and that emotions as we know them would
be unthinkable without social interaction. Emotions are
linked to objects and reason, they are, e.g. structured by
expectations, status, and hierarchy (Jasper, 2014). The
emotions with which we react to a particular observa-
tion depend also on the process of attribution (or mod-
els of causation). We can only be angry or outraged if an-
other subject (individual, collective, or juridical person)
can be blamed, whereas wemight feel shame if it turned
out that we were responsible ourselves. The latter ex-
ample also reveals how feelings impact us in different
ways. Jasper associates indignation with activation (“can
move us toward action”), and shame with passivity (“de-
flating”, Jasper, 2014, p. 345).6 This is also why emotions
are linked with judgments, or can at least be understood
to convey judgments.Without necessarily having to go as
far as Nussbaum and others (Nussbaum, 1996; Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1988), who equate emotions with cog-
nition, they clearly are more than pre-cognitive entities
opposed to reason, as the century-long debate about
crowds has implied.
6. Methodology
What people feel and what they say is not always coher-
ent. Compassion and sympathy towards refugees is ex-
plained or reasoned for by participants of this study in a
variety of ways. Individuals usually feel the need to “jus-
tify” or to provide reasons for their actions; rarely did
we encounter a participant who simply said she helped
because she “felt that way”. The more contentious an
issue is, the more subjects are exposed to what Boltan-
ski and Thévenot (2006) call a “justification imperative”.
While all kinds of social action are framed by their agents,
advocating for immigration might demand more reason-
ing (see data about attitudes towards migration from
ALLBUS survey, mentioned above). Volunteers usually
outline certain conditions for their willingness to wel-
come migrants. These include the geographical exten-
sion of their solidarity as much as refugees’ readiness
to adapt to cultural and social norms in Germany. These
preconditions structure, I argue, the modalities of feel-
ing (can refugees be blamed for their own situation?
Are they really in need of help?, etc.) and they simulta-
neously represent building blocks of different modes of
belonging, or the lack thereof. Responding to the need
to offer persuasive reasons, rather than simply reflect-
ing on intrinsic motivation, social agents are compelled
to engage—often publicly—with private notions of what
is accepted and understood as common sense, as well
as with contested and opposing visions articulated in
5 The term ‘atmosphere’, used above in a rather colloquial way, can shed light on this problem: From a sociological point of view an atmosphere is a field
of emergence, just as the metereological background of the metaphor implies. Rather describing a definite state of things (in terms of weather: rain,
wind, temperature) it represents an impersonal intensity or environment (McCormack, 2008; Stewart, 2007) that “presses upon us” to think, act or
feel in a certain direction, exerting a force on everyone who is surrounded by it. Just as the metereological ones, sociopolitical atmospheres result from
the interplay of myriads of micro-level events, i.e. (inter-)actions on the social plane. The “atmosphere”, in which people feel drawn to participate in
welcoming activities for asylum seekers is both impersonal, and nothing any social or political agent intentionally created, and extremely meaningful
on a personal level. As Ben Anderson has put it, they are “an ill-defined indefinite something, that exceeds rational explanation and clear figuration.
Something that hesitates at the edge of the unsayable. Yet, at one and the same time, the affective qualities that are given to this something by those
who feel it are remarkable for their singularity.” (Anderson, 2009, p. 78) The concept of atmosphere allows us to reflect upon how the sum of singular
encounters, actions, etc. emanate into a transpersonal sphere, and how then this “atmosphere” provides the ground for the space of emergence (of
new things). Atmospheres thus “are a kind of indeterminate affective ‘excess’ through which intensive space–times can be created.” (Anderson, 2009,
p. 80). They can contribute to the re-arrangement of the patterns that regulate the relation between the individual and transindividual level, which
together form political bodies or the “socius”.
6 This is one of the central arguments of affect theories deriving from Spinoza (1677/2000): Affects have either passivizing effects or they increase
the subject’s power to act. While there are numerous interpretations and nuances added to this central theme in contemporary affect theory,
Spinoza essentially believed that “passions” and their deflating qualities can be neutralised by our appropriate understanding of their true causes, i.e.
by reason.
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public. It is assumed that reason has a constitutively
social quality: through reasoning, we make an implicit
statement revealing our ideas regarding social relations
and the ways in which human beings are connected to
one another. For example, participants who reason that
refugees are a welcome labor force rely on market-type
social relations, implying a mode of connection which is
rather utilitarian. Also, this kind of communication im-
plies a certain strategic dimension (Snow & Byrd, 2007;
Westby, 2002). Social and political agents calculate the
possible successes of framing strategies by considering
hegemonic norms, potential connections, interventions,
or dynamics. Thus, frames are particularistic by favor-
ing one perspective over another, but their particular-
ism needs to be expressed in more universal ways. To be
convincing, social agents will choose reasons and argu-
ments which allow others to share their view and to find
the perspective “convincing”, as formulated by the Neo-
Gramscian school of political theory (Overbeek, 2000).
This is why reasons provided by individuals and other
social agents do not necessarily represent their intrin-
sic motivation or emotional setup. One of the difficul-
ties that arises from this constellation has methodologi-
cal consequences: How to identify emotions if what peo-
ple express in narrations is mostly situated on the level
of reason, social norms, and justifications?
As Kleres (2010) has pointed out even within a so-
ciological framework, there is little methodological in-
sight on how to conduct an analysis of narrative mate-
rial with regard to its emotional dimension. He suggests
reconstructing emotional dimensions and layers of emo-
tional meaning through a narrative analysis, based on
the seminal findings of Schütze (1983). Schütze’s basic
argument is that a principle homology exists between
“ad hoc narratives and original processes of experience”
(Kleres, 2010, p. 196). The narrative structure of any face-
to-face communication, he argues along with Schütze,
“forces the narrator to include the necessary and suffi-
cient aspects in order to constitute a plausible, coher-
ent, and complete story” (Kleres, 2010, p. 196). While
only the narrative structures run parallel to the past ex-
perience, the argumentative patterns are “expressive of
present contexts”. As I argue, they also imply a certain
pattern of coherence. The barriers or fissures between
present context and past experience are transported by
all kinds of linguistic expressions, ranging from symp-
tomatic leaps to hyperboles. Basing the analysis on the
narrative dimension allows for a reconstructing of the
ways in which agency is emotionally loaded. One way
of understanding emotions here is to look at the attri-
bution of agency and the construction of relationships
in the narratives, in which e.g. harm is done from one
person to another. Can we blame someone else, or is
there no “social address”, as with natural disasters? This
corresponds to Spinoza’s theory of the affect in which
agency is defined as a capacity to act (and not be acted
upon), which is correlated to feelings of joy or sadness. In
anger narratives we can trace how a subject narrates the
“self as an object” (Kleres, 2010), and helplessness can
be determined by identifying grammatical features such
as modal auxiliaries, try predicates, and negation (Capps
& Ochs, 1995). We can see then how anger relates to
the notion of a causal relationship, particularlywhen sub-
jects do not become angry because “they found no one
to ascribe agency to” (Kleres, 2010, p. 192). In his own
empirical work, Kleres studied the relationship between
types of emotional patterns and the scope of solidarity
voiced by interviewees. Similar to his argument about
the particular relationship between cognitive operations
and feelings that result in different layers or scales of sol-
idarity, I will in the following explore how emotions and
reason interconnect in the narration of volunteers who
help refugees in Germany.
7. Scope and Scale of Solidarity
One of the ways we tried to capture this problem was
by discussing possible deportations of refugees follow-
ing negative decisions about their asylum applications.
In their study on deportation protests in Austria, Rosen-
berger and Winkler (2013) have outlined a typology
of arguments used by those seeking to undermine de-
portation efforts. According to the authors, there are
three different types of argumentation focusing, respec-
tively, on concepts of integration, humanity, and human
rights (Rosenberger &Winkler, 2013, p. 124). While local
groupsmostly invoke the first principle, translocal groups
also refer to the other two. Campaigns against deporta-
tions are mostly local and centered around an individ-
ual case, as Ruedin and Merhaut (2016) have shown in
a longitudinal comparison of three countries (Germany,
Switzerland, Austria). The social proximity between cit-
izens and deportees seems to allow for stronger kinds
of engagement. Such local campaigns are often capable
of mobilizing citizens across the political spectrum, un-
der the condition that the initiative is stripped of a no-
ticeable political affiliation. Personal proximity can also
lead to the development of emotional bonds, some-
times expressed in family metaphors, in which German
volunteers describe refugees as “children”. While such
involvement can produce strong forms of engagement,
it does not necessarily lead to a universalizing reason-
ing about migration, borders, and citizenship. By ask-
ing our participants about such real or potential depor-
tations, we wanted to explore the two tendencies in-
volved here. Would volunteers oppose such a decision
(and also act upon their opposition), or were the rela-
tionships that volunteers had established with refugees
“conditional” on the formal validation of their status as
refugees? In this context, questions about the scope of
volunteers’ solidarity also emerged:When do volunteers
feel they need to act—when migrants were stranded in
Macedonia, or after they arrived in German neighbor-
hoods? During the initial months, at the height of the so-
called refugee crisis, as mentioned above, there were nu-
merous reports about volunteers travelling to Slovenia,
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Croatia, and Greece to help the refugees on arrival and
to try to facilitate their respective journeys to Germany.
During group interviews, we discovered that volunteers
employed a number of different approaches when dis-
cussing such topics. One of themwas to frame responses
on the micro-social level. Most of our informants began
their involvement at the point in time when refugees
arrived at local shelters or housing facilities, inevitably
fusing local lives with those of the newly-arrived asylum
seekers. Proximity and responsibility were connected, as
one respondent underlined:
We could not dealwith the images fromBudapest any-
more. You cannot watch these scenes, happening 300
kilometers away. It’s hard to bear—at least forme and
many others I know, too. That does not mean that ev-
eryone in the whole world should come to live in Ger-
many, of course—but there is a concrete problem that
requires a concrete and immediate solution.
In the same conversation, another participant said
that relationships with refugees would have to remain
nonetheless casual:
This might sound cruel, but we all have to move on to
other places someday. I see it that way. So, if I meet
you today, I might find you very pleasant, but I may
well never see you again. Too bad. But I cannot pur-
sue every possible friendship, because I already know
enough people. However, if you need help now, or if
I see you somewhere on a train and in need of assis-
tance, I support you immediately.
In this sense, proximity and the bonds developed out of
contact serve as a regulatory principle to organize deci-
sions about when and to whom voluntary assistance is
offered. This principle seems to apply to the emotional
realm as well. Volunteers who emphasized that they
tried to avoid emotional proximity often employedmore
utilitarian arguments to justify their involvement. For ex-
ample, one participant explained that, in order to main-
tain a certain distance, she would never accept dinner in-
vitations from refugees. Such a relationship also became
the object of public debate at the height of the so-called
refugee crisis in Germany, when the head of the Council
of the Protestant Church in Germany, Heinrich Bedford-
Strohm, advocated for what he called an Abschiedskultur
(“culture of farewell”) as opposed toWillkommenskultur.
The termwas soon picked up by other politicians, who ar-
gued that it was necessary for Germans to prepare them-
selves for the fact thatmany asylum seekers would be de-
nied protection either because they would not fulfill the
criteria determined by the asylum law or because they
had already applied for asylum elsewhere. These asy-
lum seekers would have to return. The statement high-
lighted the role of emotions in decision-making about
refugee politics as an eminent dimension in the public de-
bate. However, the importance of personal bonds with
refugees, and the correlation with political claims, ap-
pear to be more complex.
Almost all informants in the study conveyed that
emotions played a role in their volunteering experience.
Data from two surveys (Karakayali & Kleist, 2016) sug-
gests that, in particular, those volunteers who began
helping refugees in 2015 assess their activities more of-
ten as emotionally important than did volunteers who
were active before 2014. I want to highlight two cases
here, which represent rather unusual accounts of narrat-
ing emotions, since they both emphasize their distance
to emotionality. One informant in our study stood out
for his self-depiction as sociopathic or non-social. Hismo-
tivation to engage, and why he would not “fraternize”
with refugees, was combined with descriptions of every-
day avoidance strategies. His narrative starts with a story
about his commute to work, which led him past a recep-
tion shelter for refugees; in the peak of the reception
crisis, this shelter was crowded with refugees, many of
whomhad to sleep in front of the building. As seeing fam-
ilies lying on cardboard was “hard to bear” (VEG, Inter-
view 3, p. 2) for him, he decided to change his route. Of
course, he concedes, he could not entirely suppress the
information, and he eventually had to engage. In another
passage, this participant talks more generally about this
strategy, i.e., that he tried to not let certain images and
information affect him toomuch: “I try to not let that get-
ting too close to me. I am not fading it out entirely, but I
also try to not let it too near me” (VEG, Interview 3, p. 4).
Volunteering for a good cause is something he portrayed
as normal by referring to the environment in which he
grew up as an “environment where you just help” (VEG,
Interview 3, p. 5). Usage of the term “normal” or, more
often, the phrase “helping is themost normal thing in the
world” (VEG, Interview 3, p. 6), also in other cases, seems
to help avoid talking about personal motivation and feel-
ings. When it came to his feelings, he mostly seemed to
recount how to avoid having them, thus implicitly con-
veying their impact.
This complexity can in part be attributed to the ways
inwhich cognitive acts and emotions relate to each other.
As mentioned above, one way to understand this rela-
tion is to look at the narrative structure of responses
to the “deportation” question. This is a moment where
most interviewees had trouble formulating a clear-cut
answer. Usually, they had talked about their empathy to-
wards the refugees that they worked with in earlier parts
of the conversation. Being confronted with the possibil-
ity of deportation—which is not something entirely vir-
tual but something that actually happens—their narra-
tions slowed down, and the narrators stumbled. Inter-
view 1 sets an example (VEG, Interview 1, p. 23), when
the enumeration of the possible options the narrator
would have is marked by indications of insecurity (“eh
eh eh”). The tension between feelings and possible ac-
tions was highlighted in her statement “Or I,—I would
certainly be affected….But I wouldn’t know a solution”.
The overall pattern of the narration was oscillation, a
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back and forth between the feeling of urgency and her
incapability or hesitation to translate this feeling of “be-
ing affected” into what she considered appropriate re-
sponses on the level of action. Her conclusion, “I have
never done such a thing”, suggests that she could not,
or she might not have wanted, to elucidate reasons why
she would have to subscribe to decisions of authorities
concerning the residence of asylum seekers. She rather
shifted her incapacity to act to a merely pragmatic ar-
gument. “I have never done such a thing,” is something
we say when we do not want to perform the respec-
tive action without genuinely ruling it out. It is impor-
tant to mention that her feelings of sympathy towards
refugees are entirely generic. She had no personal social
relationship with any refugee. Her reticence regarding
the issue of opposing deportation might thus be rooted
in the fact that her position was grounded in moral con-
siderations, not in personal bonds. This might also ex-
plain why her strongest depiction of feelings referred
to volunteers or people who showed compassion, not
refugees. In her description of donations from the pop-
ulation (VEG, Interview 1, p. 13), she used the word
“overwhelming” three times in a row (the German term
“umwerfend” is unusual here because it is used more
commonly in aesthetic contexts, when something is con-
sidered extraordinarily beautiful). When asked whether
she remembered intensive moments, the informant first
answered negatively,
not with the refugees…
but I do find intense the reactions of the population
ehm,when there is a k-call for donations, what kind of
a reaction there was. I found that quite,…really stun-
ning. Stunning.”
Interviewer: Mmh.
Informant: Stunning.
The majority of volunteers reported similar experiences
of excitement. One interviewee described it as a feeling
of sociality: “I am really happy and this is, is a feeling like,
being part of a whole” (VEG, Interview 8, p. 29). She also
used terms such as “pride”, “joy”, and a “feeling of happi-
ness” (VEG, Interview 8, p. 29). Another participant (VEG,
Interview 14, p. 2) recollected how she mobilized her so-
cial environment, starting with her own family: “Then I
called my father, whether he could help out, and our
older daughter and then, I have to say, wewere suddenly
35 people. Really, that was very moving, very diverse,
old and young, men and women, East and West. It was
awesome.” Here, reason and emotion address the for-
mation of in-group collectives. The feeling of being part
of a larger community can be associated with problem-
atic tendencies concerning the effects of mass psychol-
ogy, but it also reveals, in a Spinozian perspective, the
appropriate insight that the individual’s capacity to act is
indeed tied up with external, social conditions of action.
From the perspective of social movement studies, this is
an example of a type of emotion which has cohesive ef-
fects on the virtual collective of volunteers (love, friend-
ship, pride). The subject, rather than being affected by its
own actions, is “overwhelmed”—apparently in a positive
way—by the compassionate actions of others (of which
she saw herself as being part of).
Thus, there are two ways in which one of the most
common metaphors for proximity—the family—comes
into play: 1) Refugees are seen and addressed as family
members, and volunteers often describe being enriched
socially and culturally by the experience. This reflects a
particular possibility towards integration or “becoming
German”; and 2) Family terms are not used as a means
to describe emerging emotional bonds between volun-
teers and refugees, but are rather intended to mobilize
empathy and evoke the notion of equality: refugees are
said to be “just like us”, and their decision to migrate is
thus comprehensible, since “we” would do so, too (often
referring to family experience in the aftermath of World
War II).
When a desire to help others is based on the expe-
rience of proximity and compassion, one might assume
that volunteering would contribute to the reproduction
of asymmetrical power relations. As Didier Fassin and
many others have argued, if caregivers retain the power
to decide who will receive what kind of help, this re-
produces a “relation of inequality” (Fassin, 2012, p. 3).
Our study explored this phenomenon by introducing the
topic of gratitude. According to Boltanski’s work on the
mechanisms of charity, based on Adam Smith’s theory of
Moral Sentiments, one of the decisive elements of the
relationship between benefactor and recipient is the lat-
ter’s display of gratitude (Boltanski, 2004). In our inter-
views, we asked volunteers whether they were ever frus-
trated with their work, or if they felt exploited etc. In
our fieldwork, and also in the group discussions, we of-
ten came across stories about volunteers, who e.g. were
angry with refugees “cherry-picking” donated clothes or
not showing up to German classes. When we brought up
these issues during our conversations, the majority re-
jected the notion that they would want “something in
return”. Volunteers wanted to avoid the impression that
they condition their commitment on reciprocity. After
narrating experiences of disappointment, they usually
emphasized their understanding and provided a variety
of justifications or explanations for those incidents. Here,
the reasons given by volunteers seemed to dampen
their own negative feelings. The most common way to
do this was to remove or replace responsibility from
refugees to, e.g. the asylum system. What volunteers
achieve with this operation is not confined to the reg-
ulation of internal emotional mechanisms, it also con-
tributes to the reproduction of a consensus in the vol-
unteer and refugee supporters’ movement, according to
which refugees have to be portrayed as victims, deprived
of their agency (see Hess & Karakayali, 2016).
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According to Fassin, this imbalance lies at the heart
of humanitarianism: it does not necessarily result in the
claim for fundamental rights. Immanuel Kant made the
same argument in his Perpetual Peace, insisting that the
protection of strangers is not a question of philanthropy,
but of rights (see Kant, 1795/1983, Article 3).7 Philan-
thropy can be seen as a rather weak foundation, leav-
ing the decision of whether or not an individual in need
will receive assistance to entirely volatile factors. Most
importantly, humanitarianism’s tendency to exclude ref-
erences to the social or political context of suffering
plays a decisive role for such critiques (Whitebrook, 2002,
p. 530). There are instances in which volunteers feel
drawn to the experience of refugees as fellow human be-
ings, leading to an identification of injustices that must
be addressed. In other cases, however, volunteers seem
to avoid the contextual themes that would bring ques-
tions of global inequality to the fore, and instead focus
on issues of integration. The grievances in such accounts
focus on the state authorities’ lack of organization to pro-
vide resources for integration efforts.
8. Conclusion
The aim of this article was to better understand the re-
lationship between emotions, reasoning, and the con-
struction of social bonds (or of their expansion). The find-
ings of the study show that some volunteers “manage”
their emotions in order to avoid being affected, while
others experience “happiness” as a result of their “ca-
pacity to act”. Meanwhile, the emotional regime of char-
ity, in which a certain hierarchy or imbalance is implied,
seems to be in place. The scope of solidarity is rather nar-
row. There are only very few accounts of transnational
social connectedness. Mostly, volunteers place their soli-
darity within a local or national framework. When volun-
teers reframe the cause of refugees as a local problem, a
problem of local infrastructures, of the local hostility of
other citizens etc., they tend to suppress other aspects,
i.e., the political and social context of forced migration.
The findings above suggest that volunteers, rather than
expanding collectivities or redefining groupmembership,
tend to engage in a way that allows them to maintain
established boundaries of belonging. When it comes to
the constitution of collectives, feelings of responsibility
for refugees, in most cases, rather seem to help consti-
tute the collective of volunteers—and respectively, the
community or neighbourhood they live in.
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